Vice Admiral J. J. Blackham, and Admiral Sir Peter Abbott, written between 1995 and 1998 . These provide perceptive British insights on the changing maritime dimension of our post-Cold War world and the increased roles for maneuvers and forward presence in shaping a new strategic environment. These are exactly the kinds of issues with which the U.S. armed forces are now struggling.
The essays' chief drawbacks are their brevity and what they do not say. The insights presented are clearly worthwhile and for that very reason deserve expansion. For example, what were the working-level debates that undergirded the flag officers' presentations? The fact that the essays cover the seven-year period up to only three years ago would indicate that the issues raised with regard to the changing role of naval forces in the new century are still as far from being fully resolved in the Royal Navy as they are in the U.S. naval service. This suggests room for both an equivalent American publication and another Maritime Strategic Studies Institute paper, as both navies continue the process of rethinking naval power that collectively began in 1991. EDWARD The U.S. intelligence community, as it currently exists, is fundamentally flawed and must be remade. With this opening premise, Bruce Berkowitz, a senior consultant at RAND Corporation, and Allan Goodman, former dean of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, present their blueprint for the future of American intelligence.
According to the authors, a trio of factors threatens to leave the intelligence community ineffective and irrelevant. First, it is no revelation that the end of the Cold War has left the intelligence community without a single clear threat as a focus for its analytic efforts. The past emphasis on the Soviet Union offered intelligence analysts historical continuity. Change tended to be evolutionary; for example, one generation of Soviet submarines offered insights into the next. Today, however, nations and nonstate actors have unprecedented access to technology and information and with it a new capability to organize and operate rapidly across borders. These developments create the prospect of an "instantaneous threat" against the United States from entirely unexpected sources.
Second, if Carl von Clausewitz was correct in defining intelligence as "every sort of information about the enemy and his country," fundamental changes in information management must create fundamental changes in intelligence. Berkowitz and Goodman observe that the intelligence community was created on an industrial model designed for the efficient production of standardized products. But today, consumers receive customized, on-demand information from their stockbrokers, news services, and on-line retailers; they expect nothing less from their intelligence suppliers. Further, intelligence products have become just one of the numerous data streams used by decision makers-and not necessarily the most important one. Americans are increasingly skeptical of "received wisdom" from authority (institutional or individual) and will "channel surf" for the intelligence support they expect.
Finally, the authors discuss the challenges posed by changes in American political attitudes toward intelligence. Where Americans once allowed intelligence agencies to be accountable to but a handful of elected officials, today they increasingly expect much more transparency to the public. Further, political realities suggest that for the foreseeable future intelligence agencies will receive no additional funding.
The likely bureaucratic answer to these challenges is to reorganize, seek efficiencies, and work more closely with the customer. However, the authors believe that seeking greater efficiency within the current intelligence model is not an effective answer. While they give the intelligence community high marks for satisfying identified customer requirements, they believe that today's world of "instantaneous threats" and operations other than war makes it impossible for most customers to identify intelligence requirements early enough to permit the intelligence bureaucracy to respond. Simply put, today's structure is a recipe for always being a step behind. The introductory pages of this book are suffused with a disagreeable arrogance and condescension. Speaking of the U.S. Army in which he spent his career, Ralph Peters states that he is "loyal to it still, much as one might care for an old lover felled by drink and bad decisions." With a metaphorical sad shake of the head but his face set nobly toward a higher truth, he sets out on a twelve-essay description of his vision of the future and the blindness of today's military leaders. This reviewer was quite prepared for an annoying slog through a tendentious book. One essay takes issue with the notion of a technologically based revolution in military affairs (RMA). Though to a degree he argues against straw men, Peters's main point is that technological issues are secondary to understanding the human nature of future foes-no argument there. On the other hand, in another essay he claims that "current and impending technologies could permit us to reinvent warfare," allowing us to attack instigators of violence rather than their populations. Ironically, two other essays
